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IN THE SUPREME ;COURT Of THE
STATE OF UTAH
MARY A. MURPHY, dba ALEX PICKERING TRANSFER COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, REDMAN MOVING & STORAGE COMPANY, BARTON TRUCK
LINE, INC., UINTAH FREIGHTWAYS,
MAGNA - GARFIELD TRUCK LINE,
PALMER BROTHERS, INC., RIO
GRANDE MOTOR WAY, INC., MILNE TRUCK LINES, INC., ASHWORTH TRANSFER, INC., BILLS
MOVING, INC., A-ONE MOVING
AND DELIVERY, LEWIS BROS.
STAGE LINES, UTAH PACKAGE EXPRESS, INC., DENVER & RIO
GRANDE
WESTERN
RAILROAD
COMPANY, and PARK CITY TRUCK
LINE,
Defendants.

Case No.
12920

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
NATURE OF CASE
This is an original action brought in this Court to
review orders of the Public Service Commission of Utah
(the "C0mmission"), restricting plaintiff's permit auchorizing operations as a contract motor carrier of all
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kinds of personal property within a SO-mile radius of
Salt Lake City.
DISPOSITION BELOW
The Commission ordered on May 12, 1972, that
plaintiff desist from rendering contract carrier service
except for the accounts of two shippers she had served
m 1954, that her contract carrier schedule of rates filed
in 1972 be temporarily suspended and that she show
cause later why her schedule should not be permanently
suspended and permit altered or cancelled. On July 10,
1972, the Commission ordered the schedule be perma·
nently suspended and that plaintiff permanently desist
from rendering contract carrier service except for one
shipper she served irt 1954.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Plaintiff prays that the Commission's orders of May
12 and July 10, 1972, be vacated and set aside, and that
plaintiff be awarded her costs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On May 16, 1936, the Commission issued to John
M. Murphy, dba Alex Pickering Transfer Company, a
"grandfather" Contract Carrier Permit No. 130, authoriz·
ing him to operate on call and over all of the highways of
the State of Utah as a contract motor carrier of all kinds of
personal property, including merchandise, machinery
and other property which he has occasion to carry in the
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course of the conduct of his transportation business. <R.
115) This permit is the subject of this suit.

In 1946, the Commission issued to Murphy Common Motor Carrier Certificate No. 684, authorizing transportation of general commodities over irregular routes in
certain defined portions of Salt Lake City and County,
m. 97) being a much smaller area than the SO-mile radial
contract carrier authority hereafter described. This certificate is only incidentally involved herein.
Murphy died in 19S3. On November 17, 19S4, after
notice by newspaper publication and mail as contained in
the Commission's record, and following a hearing at
which no one appeared in opposition, the Commission
issued its Order (R. 97-102), transferring to plaintiff
Mary A. Murphy, widow of John M. Murphy, Certificate
of Convenience and Necessity No. 684, and Contract
Carrier Permit No. 130. The notice of the hearing gave
notice only that plaintiff had applied for transfer to her
of the Certificate and Permit held by her deceased husband <R. 103). The Commission restated the contract
carrier permit to read as follows:
". . . to operate as a contract motor carrier of all
kinds of personal property including merchandise,
machinery, and other property which she has occasion to carry in the course of the conduct of her
said transportation business within a SO mile radius of Salt Lake City, excluding pickup and delivery service within the area described in Certificate of Convenience and Necessity No. 684."
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In concluding its Order, the Commission included its
usual language:.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, That the above
described Certificate and Permit shall become effective twenty (20) days from the date hereof
upon the condition that applicant files the necessary insurance and tariffs or contracts with respect to the permit, in accordance with the Commission's rules and regulations. Upon failure to
file insurance and tariffs within twenty (20) days
after date of this order, the certificate and permit
herein issued shall become null and void.
"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, and is made a
condition of the Certificate and Permit herein issued that the applicant shall render reasonably
adequate and continuous service in pursuance of
the authority herein granted, and that failure to
do so shall constitute sufficient grounds for termination, change, or suspension of said Certificate
and Permit."
Insurance and tariff filings for the common carrier
::1uthority and contracts with Campbell Soup Company
and Industrial Supply Company for contract carriage
were thereafter timely filed (R. 82). Neither the Permit
granted Murphy in 1936, nor the one issued to plaintiff
Mary Murphy on the transfer in 1954 contained any discussion, findings, conclusions or order restricting the authorized contract carrier service to any particular present
or future shipper.
Plaintiff is an 89-year-old widow <Tr. 14). Her sons,
Charles and Paul Murphy, have managed and operated
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the business for her at all times before March 1, 1972 <Tr.
13), except from June 16 to August 30, 1970, when Guy
Brinkerhoff managed it <Tr. 13). On March 1, 1972,
Max Young began and continues to manage the business
(Exhibit 1).
Plaintiff continues to date to make contract deliveries for Campbell Soup Company (Tr. 52, 56). After
1954, records could be located to show plaintiff performed
contract carrier shipments under her authority as follows
rnxhibit 3):

Year
1955
1956
1957
1959
1959
1960
1960
1961
1962
1962
1962
1962
1963
1970
1970

No.

of Trips

Shipper
Industrial Supply
Industrial Supply
Industrial Supply
American Paper
George A. Parry & Sons
Crestline Components
Industrial Supply
Metals Supply
Kaiser Aluminum
Metals Supply
American Greetings
Wheelwright Lumber
Kaiser Aluminum
Crane Supply
Wolfe's

6
6
6
1
I
1
1
1
3
3
1
I
1

2
1

Charles Murphy testified that the only records now
available of movements in the 1950's and 1960's were an
accounts receivable journal <Exhibit 5), from which the
foregoing was taken. The accounts receivable journal
does not usually show origin and destination of move-
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ments so most contract carrier movements within the SO
mile radius as opposed to common carrier movements in
the Salt Lake City area, cannot be isolated in most instances, and there may well have been other contract
carrier movements other than as shown above <Tr. 57.
58). Defendant Barton's witness, for instance, testified
its records are destroyed after seven years <Tr. 72).
Guy Brinkerhoff had been an investigator for the
Commission for ten years when he resigned in 1970 to
manage plaintiff's business. After six weeks, he returned
to the Commission. It was he who arranged the contract
carrier shipments under verbal contract with Crane Sup?lY in 1970 <Tr. 149-150, 213-214>.
On March 1, 1972, Max Young commenced to manage plaintiff's business <Exhibit I>. On March 28, 1972,
he filed for plaintiff a schedule of contract carrier rates
with the Commission to be effective on one day's notice
<Exhibit 36, R. 16), after discussing the filing procedure
with and securing approval thereof from Keith Sohm, the
Commission's 20-year Commerce Attorney in charge of
rate and schedule filings and hearings <Tr. 166-168, 186189). Plaintiff filed with the Commission a contract with
Certified Warehouse on April 6, 1972 (Exhibit 31), and
one with General Electric on April 25, 1972 <Exhibit 30),
both incorporating plaintiff's schedule <Exhibit 36), as
to rates. Sohm testified the Commission accepts either
the contracts or a schedule of rates and names of contract shippers, as a proper filing <Tr. 187). Between
April 10 and May 15, 1972, when the Commission or"
dered plaintiff to desist (R. 53), plaintiff handled 75 con-
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tract carrier movements for Certified Warehouse and lS
for General Electric. <Exhibit 4)
Upon petition from defendant carriers filed April 20,
1972 ( R. 1), on April 24, 1972, the Commission issued
notice that a hearing would be held May 2, 1972, on defendant common carriers' petition for cancellation of
plaintiff's Contract Carrier Permit <R. 31). At the hearing, plaintiff objected to the early setting <R. 37), but
notwithstanding, the Commission on May 12, 1972, without taking any evidence, found the issuance of the contract carrier schedule on one day's notice was "inappropriate," and ordered plaintiff's contract carrier schedule
suspended and that she desist from operating under the
contract carrier permit at all except for Campbell Soup
and Industrial Supply for 90 days, and ordered her to
show cause on June 7 why the contract carrier schedule
should not be permanently suspended and why her contract carrier permit should not be cancelled or altered. (R.
52-3)
At hearing on June 7, 1972, evidence was presented
of the foregoing. Plaintiff showed that her annual reports filed with the Commission (the years 1967 through
1971 were the only ones then in Commission files,
Ex. 6), have always specified plaintiff as operating
contract carrier authority. Charles Murphy testified
plaintiff has always had insurance coverage on file with
the Commission insuring operations within a SO-mile
radius of Salt Lake City (thus coinciding with the SO
miles from Salt Lake radial contract carrier authority as
distinguished from the much smaller area for its common
carrier authority) (Exhibits 40, 41). He testified plain-
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tiff has always had motor vehicles available to perform
contract carrier movements, has always had the office in
Salt Lake open daily during normal business hours, has '
always been listed in the telephone book, has always
been financially able to yerform the authorized contract
carrier service, has never refused to negotiate contracts,
has always been ready, willing and able to negotiate contracts for carriage of property within the authority, and
nas always been ready, willing and able to handle shipments rendered for those with whom contracts existed
<Tr. 145-149). There is no evidence or testimony whatever in the record to the contrary nor any evidence that
_plaintiff ever discontinued contract cai;rier seryice. ln.leed, Murphy commenced negotiating the General Electric contract in November, 1971, and its execution was
Jelayed until April, 1972, for General Electric's purposes
:Tr. 148). Not one witness testified that he. had ever
.:alled on plaintiff to perform or negotiate contract carrier
..ervices and had been declined for any reason.
Mr. Young testified Pickering now operates and proposes to operate its contract· carrier operation as other
contract carriers operate, and not as common carriers
operate. Specifically, they tailor the operation to the
needs of shippers. · They use small equipment so that
they can go direct to the shipper, pick up the shipment
and deliver it direct to the consignee without putting it
across a dock for consolidation with other freight, all
designed to provide a specific, direct tailored service for
,he contractor. They do not intend. to develop into a
carrier, nor to do business with anybody that
to them. They analyze the business needs of a
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particular shipper, and enter into a contract if they can
handle the traffic, and do not enter into contracts with
all persons.
"We intend to analyze the requirements of
the business, the volumes involved, the traffic
movements, determine that we have a service
that can meet the needs, determine that the contractor needs what we have to offer, enter into a
contract at that point, and go forward - or determine in that kind of analysis that we cannot
perform the specific service the shipper is requiring and tell him so." (Tr. 169-171)
Pickering does not now and does not intend to hold itself out as performing transportation service for 'the
public generally. (Tr. 172)
When Mr. Young filed the contract carrier schedule
of rates and charges <Exhibit 33, R. 16-28) in March,
1972, he went to see Keith Sohm, Commerce Attorney
for the Commission who handles rate schedule filings,
and asked him for the procedure to file special permission on short term notice on rates and charges <Tr. 166),
and was told that in view of the Commission's rules and
regulations, it could be filed on one day's notice without
special Commission permission (Tr. 168). Mr. Young
said he was filing the rates and charges in connection
with the contract that was submitted for Certified Warehouse and at a later date a contract would be filed for
General Electric. Mr. Sohm said Pickering could go
ahead and file the schedule of rates and charges (Tr.
169).
9

The Commission's Rules (Exhibit 37), provide in
Rule VII, page 12, for contract carriers of property, includ.
ine "contract ... carriers of general commodities," that
" ... contracts reducing charges specified in prior
contracts and filed subsequent to July I, 1937.
shall provide 30 days' notice of their effective
date unless otherwise authorized by the Commission; and contracts renewing or establishing increases in charges specified in prior contracts, or
establishing charges for new services, may become effective when filed."
The same Rule applies to the filing of a memorandum of
oral contracts.
Mr. Sohm testified that, with regard to the filing by
Pickering, it has been the accepted practice of the Com·
mission as long as he has been with the Commission to
allow contract carriers to file contracts on one day's notice, and "there's no requirement that they should have to
do otherwise" (Tr. 189).

In response to questions by the Commission, Mr.
Sohm testified that the practice of the Commission with
regard to contract carriers, in every instance where a
contract carrier authority is issued to serve a particular
shipper, in order to add another shipper, the Commission
must have another hearing and proof of need that existing service is inadequate must be made.
"When only one shipper is designated in
order as being authorized to be served by this
carrier, then it is a completely new case if you add
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another shipper. In the case where you have got
an open-end contract carrier authority, that has
not been required. I know of no case where a
hearing was required to add shippers to an openend type of contract authority." (Tr. 200-201)
Mr. Sohm knows of instances where contract carriers have not filed either a memorandum of oral contracts, written contracts or a schedule of their charges.
The Commission quite frequently reminds them to file
such, and has never revoked an authority for failure to do
so <Tr. 204>.
Based on that evidence, the Commission concluded:

"l. The Order of November 17, 1954, in
Case No. 2945 and Case No. 1863, contemplated
that (plaintiff) would file contracts with the
Commission designating shippers for whom she
would render a transportation service. Within
the extended time limit permitted by the Commission, the only shippers for whom contracts
were filed were Campbell Soup Company and Industrial Supply Company. After the expiration of
the extended time limit, the filing of additional
contracts or tariffs would require notice, hearing
(sic) a determination by the Commission that the
highways over which (plaintiff) desired to operate
were not unduly burdened; that the granting of
the application would not unduly interfere with
the traveling public; that the granting of the application would not be detrimental to the best
interests of the people of the State of Utah and/or
the locality to be served, and that existing transportation facilities did not provide adequate or
reasonable service.
11

"2. The failure on the part of (plaintiff> to
render reasonably adequate and continuous serv- 1
ice for Industrial Supply Company constitutes a
forfeiture of the right to now reinstitute said serv- •
ice without first demonstrating to the Commission that the service is necessary or that (plaintiff) was not responsible for the failure to give
said service. <Plaintiff) has not made either of
the necessary showings.
1

"3. That before Mary A. Murphy, dba Pickering Transfer Company, can contract with additional shippers pursuant to Contract Carrier Permit No. 130, she must obtain the assent of the
Commission in accordance with 54-6-8, Utah Code
Annotated 1953, as amended. This she has not
done. Milne Truck Lines, Inc. v. Public Service
Commission of Utah, et al., 13 Utah 2d 72, 368
P.2d 590."
Based solely upon those conclusions, the Commission ordered on July 10, 1972, that plaintiff's contract
carrier schedule be permanently suspended, and that
plaintiff:
" ( C) ease and desist from rendering any transportation service pursuant to Contract Carrier Permit
No. 130 except service for the account of Campbell Soup Company in accordance with the tariff
on file with the Commission bearing filing date of
December 23, 1954." (R. 83-84)
Plaintiff filed with the Commission timely petitions
for rehearing of the Commission's Orders of May 12 and
July 10, 1972, and upon their denial filed timely com·
plaints before this Court seeking review. This Court
issued appropriate writs of review.
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1

ARGUMENT
POINT 1. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN NOT
RULING PLAINTIFF HOLDS GENERAL CONTRACT CARRIER AUTHORITY, UNLIMITED AS
TO ANY SHIPPER.
The Commission concluded in its July 10, 1972
Order that the Order of November 17, 1954, contemplated that after plaintiff filed contracts with the Commission for whom she would render contract carrier
service, she could not thereafter perform contract carrier
service for any other shippers without the assent of the
Commission after notice, hearing and determination of
need pursuant to 54-6-8, Utah Code Annotated 1953.
Plaintiff filed contracts in 1954 with Campbell Soup
Company and Industrial Supply, and the Commission
therefore concluded in the 1972 Order that these were
the only shippers for whom plaintiff could perform contract carrier service.
The Commission erred in such conclusion. No fact
in the record supports it. There was no such restriction
contained in the Permit issued to plaintiff pursuant to
the 1954 Order. There was no discussion whatever of
such action in the findings or conclusions leading to the
1954 Order or in the 1954 Order.
The 1954 Order said only: "Upon failure to file insurance and tariffs within 20 days after date of this Order,
the certificate and permit herein issued shall become null
and void." It did not say that on failure to file "contracts,"
13

the permit would be void. lt says "tariffs," which by
Rule VI Public Service Commission of Utah Motor Car- 1
rier Rules and Regulations No. 3 <Exhibit 37), means ,
rates and charges of a common carrier.
There was no such restriction contained in the 1936
Order or Permit issued to plaintiff's deceased
The contract carrier permit issued to plaintiff's deceased
husband in 1936 was perfec,tly valid as a general, radial
permit, unrestricted as to any particular shipper. Similar
"granddaddy" permits were then issued to others. See
for instance the general permit issued to Sims, dba Salt
Lake Transfer Company, referred to in McCarthy v.
lie Service Commission, ( 1938) 94 Utah 304, 77 P.2d 331.
The validity of the general contract carrier permit is
clearly shown by Justice Wolfe in his concurring opinion
in McCarthy v. Public Service Commissi'on, <1947), 111
Utah 489, 184 P.2d 220, where, speaking as to whether
gravel haulers should have common carrier certificates or
obtain specific contract carrier authority for each shipper,
he said:
"Obviously applicants and counsel for some
of them were under the impression that if certificates of convenience and necessity are not granted
the applicants must either go out of the business of
hauling sand, gravel and cement or operate in
violation of law or go through the impracticable
procedure of obtaining a permit for each haul and
show a contract before such permit is granted
which procedure is not required by the statute. _It
appears plain that these applications for cert1f-
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icatcs ?f convenience and necessity rested on a
wrong idea of the law. (Italics ours)
. "These applicants are contract motor carriers.
The public needs their services as contract motor
carriers. I see no reason why general contract carrier permits could not be issued after the required
notice and hearing, which general permits would
allow these caniers to haul sand and gravel and
cement anywhere in the state (or in specific areas,
depending on the showing made). The permits
could limit the hauls to such distances as would
prevent undue competition with satisfactory common carriers of the same commodities in the same
area.

"If such permits were issued to these appli- •
cants they could continue to operate as they have
in the past subject, however, to the commission's
authority and power to impose insurance and other reasonable requirements on operations under
the permits.
"There is rw statutory provision which prohibits the issuance of such general contract carrier permits. Indeed, where 'grandfather rights'
to contract carrier permits are concerned such general permits were contemplated by the legislature
when it provided in Section 76-5-21, U.C.A. 1943,
as amended by the laws of Utah 1945, Chap. 105:

'The commission shall grant on application to any applicant who was a contract motor carrier as defined by this act on the 1st
day of January 1940, a permit to operate as
a contract motor carrier on the same high15

ways and to carry on the same type of motor
service as he was on said date.' (Italics his)
"The 'grandfather right' there given was rwt
limited to a particular contract or for hauling for
a particular person. If an applicant for a permit
showed that before January 1, 1940, he was hauling sand, gravel and cement within all the cities of
this state and within 15 miles therefrom (so his
hauling at that time without a permit would be
legaD and that he was hauling for anyone with
whom he chose to contract, I hazard the opinion
that he would be entitled as a matter of right to a
contract carrier permit general enough to enable
him to continue to haul gravel and cement and
sand within all the cities of this state and within
15 miles outside for whomsoever he chose to contract. The statute says he is entitled to 'a permit'
not a series of permits each based on one or more
written contracts. The legislature intended such
'grandfather' permits to be practicably available
and not to be so encumbered with conditions and
regulations as to make it so difficult to enjoy that
right as to render it of no practical value.
"The legislature contemplates a general contract motor carrier permit in an appropriate
'grandfather rights' case." (Italics ours)

The Commission's Commerce Attorney testified that
in his 20 years experience with the Commission, no hearings have been required for a general contract carrier to
add additional shippers <Tr. 200-201).
The contract carrier permit issued to John M.
Murphy in 1936 being valid as a general permit, un16

limited as to any particular shipper, the Commission was
without authority to restrict it by the 1954 order transferring it from John M. Murphy, deceased, to Mary A.
Murphy.
This precise issue is controlled by Morris v. Public
Service Commission 0958), 7 Utah 2d 167, 321 P.2d
644. There, the Commission noticed for hearing Morris'
application "to assume the operating rights" of Watson.
The Commission found at hearing that Watson's certificate had been inactive and denied the transfer application and ordered Watson's certificate cancelled. This
Court noted that 54-6-20, Utah Code Annotated 1953,
requires notice and hearing before certificates or permits
may be altered or revoked. It noted that an order of an
administrative body issued without notice is violative of
due process. It noted t..l-iat the notice given provided only
that an application to assume rights would be entertained and the issue of cancellation was not before the
Commission. This Court held:

"If the Commission had intended to entertain the
issue of unqualified cancellation, it should have
notified Watson and informed him specifically of
the grounds upon which cancellation was being
sought . .. : We hold that the Commission was acting without authority in cancelling Watson's certificate." (Emphasis added)
That is exactly the case here, except more so. Not
only does 54-6-20, U.C.A. 1953, require notice, but
Section 54-6-24 is mandatory in providing that "all rights
(and) permits" of a deceased owner "shall be transfer-
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able" and "shall be approved" if the Commission finds
that the transferee is fit, willing and able to perform and
to conform to the act. The Commission expressly so
found in paragraph 4 of the 1954 Order (R. IQQ). The
notice for the 1954 hearing said only that Mary Murphy's
application to transfer the common and contract carrier
rights would be entertained and gave no notice that any
amendment, alteration or restriction would be considered.

1

Therefore, not only did the 1954 Order not say, find,
conclude or order anything to the effect that after the expiration of any time limit, plaintiff would have to have i
Commission hearing and approval before filing any additional contracts, but most important, the Commission,
based upon the Morris case, supra, was without authority '
to alter and convert the general contract carrier permit to
one permitting transportation only for Campbell Soup or
Industrial Supply.
Furthermore, as stated by Justice Wolfe in the 1947
McCarthy case, supra, John Murphy was entitled by the
statute to a grandfather " 'permit,' not a series of permits
each based on one or more written contracts," and so was
plaintiff, for she was entitled to have transferred to her
"all rights (and) permits" of John Murphy, upon the
Commission finding her fit, willing and able pursuant to
54-6-24, U.C.A. 1953.
Milne Truck Lines, Inc., v. Public Service Commission, 0962) 13 Utah 2d 72, 368 P.2d 590, is not here in
point. There, it was held, under the peculiar facts in
evidence that Milne's general commodities common car-
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rier authority did not include petroleum in bulk. The
evidence showed: ( 1) Neither the Commission nor the
carriers in the industry ever assumed "commodities generally" included petroleum in bulk; (2) the Commission's annual report forms have separate categories for
general freight and petroleum, and Milne always reported it performed only general freight; (3) neither
lVIilne nor any other general commodities carrier ever
held itself out as a petroleum carrier; (4) the Commission and the industry niade a distinction between general
freight and bulk petroleum; and (5) only carriers with
express bulk petroleum authority had provided that service. All that the Court held there was that, under this
evidence, the Commission's determination that Milne's
general commodities authority did not include bulk petroleum was not arbitrary and capricious.
The Milne case's holding was specifically limited to
the facts there present in Reaveley v. Public Service Commission, ( 1968) 20 Utah 2d 237, 436 P.2d 797, where
this court sustained the Commission's holding that Link's
general commodities authority did include cement in bulk
even though Link had never previously transported bulk
cement.
Thus, in the Milne case, it having been found, based
on some substantial evidence, that Milne did not have
bulk petroleum authority, it follows that this Court would
say, as dicta, that:
" ... the Commission's assent was necessary before
a carrier could increase its service, even though
19

the scope of its service was not expressly limited
in the carriers certificate."

In this case, the Commission held that the reason
plaintiff must obtain Commission assent before serving
additional contract shippers is because the 1954 Order
"contemplated" such restriction in the previously general
contract carrier permit. There is, however, no substantial evidence, or any evidence whatsoever, in the record
to sustain that restriction, as there was in the Milne case.
Furthermore, the Commission would have been without
authority to enter such a restrictive order in the 1954
hearing, by reason of the statutory limitations in transferring "all rights (and) permits" of a deceased permit holder or by reason of the limited notice given therein. Since
the Commission's 1972 order that plaintiff's general contract carrier permit is restricted to 1954 shippers must ,
fail, there is no basis to reach the dicta of the Milne case
that Commission assent is necessary before a carrier can
increase its service.
Finally, plaintiff does not propose to "increase her
service," in the sense that Milne was entering into the
new and distinct bulk petroleum service, which requires
special tank vehicles and special Commission certification.
Plaintiff only desires to continue to perform the same
d.Uthorized general contract carrier service unlimited in
the permit as to any particular shipper, that her hus·
band always performed before his death and before and
after the Motor Carrier Act was enacted, and that she
always performed. Obviously, general commodities carriers, both common and contract, continuously take on
new general commodities business with new general com-

20
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modities shippers, and such is not "increasing service" in
the sense of the Milne case proscriptions. Were this not
so, every newly established shipper would have to have
a general commodities carrier obtain specific Commission
approval before transportation service would be available.
Consequently, the Commission's Conclusions Nos. 1
rmd 3 are erroneous. The Commission should have concluded, as a matter of law, that plaintiff's contract carrier permit is general and unlimited as to any particular
shipper. Her contract filings for Certified Warehouse and
General Electric are perfectly valid. The Commission's
1972, permanently suspending her conOrder of July
tract carrier schedule and ordering her to cease and desist
from rendering contract transportation service under her
permit except for Campbell Soup, should be reversed.
POINT 2. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO RENDER
SERVICE TO INDUSTRIAL SUPPLY.
The Commission's Conclusion No. 2 concluded that
plaintiff ( 1) failed to render adequate and continuous
service for Industrial Supply, and (2) that she failed
to show she was not responsible for the failure.
That Conclusion is based solely on Finding No. 4
that the last movement for Industrial Supply was on
January 25, 1962.
There is no evidence in the record that plaintiff
failed for any reason to handle any shipments tendered by
21

Industrial Supply, so the mere fact that no shipments
were handled since 1962 for Industrial does not support
a conclusion that she failed to render adequate service. :
The Commission ignored the wholly uncontradicted evidence and should have specifically found, as the only testimony on the subject showed, that plaintiff was at all
times open for business, equipped, and ready, willing and
able to handle contract carrier shipments tendered <Tr.
145-149).
In Reaveley v. Public Service Commission, supra,
where plaintiff claimed the Commission erred in failing
to find abandonment of the right to haul cement in bulk
because no such haul had ever been made by one defendant carrier and only two by the other, this Court said:
"The evidence showed there were no other
shipments ever tendered to either one of these de- ,
fondants, and so the Commission was not compelled to find there was an abandonment."
1

Bennett v. State Corporation Commission, New Mexico, 385 P.2d 978, Blackball Freight Service v. Washington Utilities and Transportation Commission, 463 P.2d
169, Musslewhite v. State Corporation Commission, New
Mexico, 295 P.2d 216, Arizona Corporation Commission
v. Pacific Motor Trucking Company, 398 P.2d 114, and
Ward v. Public Utilities Commission, Colorado, 446 P.2d
902, all stand for the proposition that with regard to irregular route or radial non-scheduled service, as here, on
the question of whether authority may be cancelled for
failure to render service, the issue is not the amount of
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,

1

service actually rendered in the past, but instead is
whether the carrier had the facilities available to render
service and was ready, willing and able at any time to
operate. More precisely put, the issue is whether the
carrier has failed, refused or been unable to render service on request, so as to constitute abandonment of the
authority. The question of abandonment is one of intent.
Certainly there is no evidence here that plaintiff intends
now to abandon service, or intended to do so in the past;
indeed. the only evidence is to the contrary. Plaintiff performed contract carrier services through the 19SO's,
1960's, in 1970 and until April 24, 1972, without objection from anyone. The Commission made no conclusion
or order with respect to plaintiff's performing services
without filing the contracts, but regardless of that, the
fact remains that the contract services were performed,
negating abandonment. Plaintiff properly filed her
schedule of rates and two contracts with the Commission
in April, 1972, before defendant carriers filed objections,
and plaintiff is even now appealing the Commission's order. That clearly belies any intent to abandon authority.
The Musslewhite case, supra, holds:
". . . Mere non-user by the holder of a certificate
authorizing non-scheduled service over irregular
routes does not constitute either abandonment or
discontinuance of service by a certificate holder
shown to be at all times fully equipped, ready,
willing and able to operate.
The Bennett case, supra, holds:
"There is, however, an obvious difference in
the reqmrements imposed upon a carrier who op-
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erates on fixed schedules and over regular routes
and those non-scheduled carriers operating over irregular routes . . . . Likewise, there is a marked
difference as to what constitutes abandonment or
dormancy of certificates of the two types of carriers. It may well be that, as to scheduled, regular route carriers, the legislature, by the amendment, provided that a particular route or schedule
may become dormant through non-use. It is quite
clear to us that the same rules cannot apply to a
carrier authorized to operate non-scheduled service over irregular routes, for the very reason that
such a carrier is not required to operate upon any
fixed schedule or to transport to any particular
place or over any regular route. All that is required is that such service be available whenever
requested by a shipper.
The Blackball case, supra, holds:
"While the record does not show extensive
operation under the permit, it undeniably shows
operation. It must be remembered that the common carrier permit here involved called for non·
scheduled, irregular route service. As such, readiness, willingness and ability to serve are more
significant elements in determining the issue of
dormancy than is a mere numerical calculation
of the number of shipments.
The Arizona Corporation Commission case, supra,
holds:

"It has long been the rule in Arizona that u_nless the Commission finds that a common earner
will not furnish the services required by its certificate of convenience and necessity, the Commis- '
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sion cannot lawfully terminate or revoke said certificate, nor can the Commission permit another
to invade the field of operation of such a carrier."
Hence, the Commission should have found, as the
only evidence shows, that plaintiff was at all times ready,
willing and able to operate as a contract carrier and that
she at no time refused or was unable to handle shipments
tendered to her. With that finding, the Commission
would have had to conclude that she did not fail to render
adequate and continuous service to Industrial Supply, or
to anyone else for that matter. (There is, however, no
finding or conclusion by the Commission that she failed
to render service to any other contract shipper.) Consequently, the Commission's order that plaintiff cease and
desist from rendering service to Industrial Supply is erroneous as being arbitrary and capricious.
POINT 3. THE COMMISSION WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO ENTER ITS MAY 12, 1972
ORDER BECAUSE ITS NOTICE WAS INADEQUATE AND THE ORDER WAS CONTRARY TO
LAW AND REGULATIONS.
The order of May 12, 1972, temporarily suspending
petitioner's contract carrier schedule, was entered after
hearing on May 2, 1972. That hearing was held pursuant to notice dated April 24, 1972 ( R. 31), a period of
less than ten days. Section 54-7-9, U .C.A. 1953, requires
ten days notice of hearing, absent finding by the Commission that public necessity requires earlier hearing.
Such finding was not made. Plaintiff objected in writing
<R. 37) before the hearing. Notwithstanding, the Com-
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mission, without taking any evidence <R. 52), entered
the May 12, 1972 order, temporarily suspending the con.
tract carrier schedule and ordered plaintiff to desist from
contract service other than Campbell Soup and Industrial Supply (the latter was not tendering any shipments)
thus effectively putting Pickering out of contract carrier
business, including nullifying the new contract business
with Certified Warehouse and General Electric.
The only "finding of fact" to sustain that order was
that the filing of the contract carrier schedule on one
day's notice "was inappropriate" (R. 52). This was
clearly erroneous, according to all past practice of the I
Commission, as testified to by Mr. Sohm <Tr. 169, 189), '
and according to the Commission's own Rule VII <Exhibit 37, page 12), which allows all contracts, except
those reducing charges in prior filed contracts, to be
"effective when filed."
POINT 4. THE COMMISSION WAS WITHOUT AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE JULY JO, 1972
ORDER UNDER THE NOTICE GIVEN.
The July 10, 1972 order severely restricts plaintiff's
general contract carrier authority based upon the Com·
mission's interpretation of the 1954 Order. Nowhere in
the notices dated April 24, 1972 (R. 31), or May 12, 1972,
was plaintiff given notice that the meaning of the 1954
Order would be considered. Defendants' petition (R. 1-6l
which commenced the whole affair, did not even raise
that question. All grounds on which defendants prayed
for relief in their petitions were found without merit by
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the Commission, but notwithstanding the Commission

proceeded to restrict plaintiff's certificate on a wholly new
but unnoticed ground.
In Morris v. Public Service Commission, supra, this
Court held:

"If the Commission had intended to entertain the issue of unqualified cancellation, it should
have notified Watson (the certificate holder), and
informed him specifically of the grounds upon
which cancellation was being sought."
Here, plaintiff was notified that cancellation of her permit would be entertained, but no one ever prayed for interpretation of the 1954 Order or the permit issued thereby, and she was given no notice of those specific grounds.
As in Morris, the Commission was without authority to
interpret the 1954 Order and the 1972 orders should
therefore be reversed.
CONCLUSION
The Commission's Orders should not be set aside
unless ( 1) the Commission has acted without authority,
(2) there is no substantial evidence to supp0rt the order,
or (3) the Commission's order is unreasonable or arbitrary.
The Commission was without authority and was
arbitrary in interpreting its 1954 Order in the July, 1972
hearing without notice or prayer that such be done, and
in setting the May, 1972 hearing on short notice contrary
to statute and over objection. The Commission arbitrarily
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and without authority held "inappropriate" plaintiff's
schedule of rates because it was issued on one day's notice, when the Commission's own practice and rules
permit such.

1

There is no evidence whatever that plaintiff failed or
refused at any time to handle any contract shipments or
to negotiate contracts, and the uncontradicted evidence
shows plaintiff was at all times ready, willing and able to
perform. Consequently, plaintiff did not abandon or dis- '
continue contract carrier service, and the Commission's
Order that she desist from serving Industrial Warehouse
is arbitrary and unreasonable.
Plaintiff's deceased husband was entitled to be issued and was issued a "granddaddy" contract carrier permit, unrestricted as to any particular shipper. On his demise, the Commission expressly found his widow, plaintiff, was fit, willing and able to operate his permit and
was therefore entitled, pursuant to statute, to "all rights
(and) permits" of her husband. Under the statute and
under the notice given of the trapsfer hearing in 1954,
the Commission was without authority to restrict those
rights and permit to any particular shippers. There is no
evidence that the Commission "contemplated" restricting
the contract carrier permit to any particular shippers.
The Commission's Order of July 10, 1972, holding that
the 1954 order did restrict the permit to certain shippers,
was made without authority, was unfounded in the evidence and was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious and
contrary to law.
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WHEREFORE, plaintiff prays the Court reverse the
Commission's Orders of May 12, and July 10, 1972, and
that plaintiff be awarded her costs.
Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & DRAPER by
JOSEPH J. PALMER

Attorneys for Plaintiff
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